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Abstract
‘Indigenous knowledge’ is a relatively recent buzz phrase that, amongst other
things, constitutes part of a challenge to ‘western’ education. Apologists of
indigenous knowledge not only maintain that its study has a profound effect
on education and educational curricula but emphasise its significance in
antiracist, antisexist and postcolonialist discourse, in general, and in terms of
the ‘African Renaissance’, in particular. In this paper, I argue the following:
(1) ‘indigenous knowledge’ involves at best an incomplete, partial or, at worst,
a questionable understanding or conception of knowledge; (2) as a tool in anti-
discrimination and anti-repression discourse (e.g. driving discussions around
literacy, numeracy, poverty alleviation and development strategies in Africa),
‘indigenous knowledge’ is largely inappropriate. I show, further, that in the
development of ‘knowledge’, following some necessary conceptual
readjustments in our understanding of this term, there is considerably greater
common ground than admitted by theorists. It is this acknowledgement, not lip
service to a popular concept of debatable relevance, that has profound
educational and ethical consequences.
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Spirituality in an Aboriginal sense is. . . the starting point that requires no demonstration or
proof; it exists and all truths begin and end there. This is the fundamental difference
between what is seen as scientific truth and spiritual truth in contemporary society. To look
for objectivity in the Aboriginal world is to question one’s identity and one’s sense of
being. Objectivity as a notion is culturally inappropriate. . . One does not look for
something that is not there (Scott Fatnowna and Harry Pickett, 2002b). 
The tokoloshe is real – it does exist. . . When Africans fear the tokoloshe they are not
fearing a figment of their imaginations. . . I have personally fallen victim to mantindane –
not once, but three times – and I still carry the scars on my body to testify to the truth of
what I say (Credo Mutwa, Isilwane – The Animal).
Traditionally, education proceeded along colonialist lines, with virtually total disregard for
indigenous knowledge systems (William Makgoba, in a lunchtime talk on Africanisation
and education, co-presented with Console Tleane in the Department of Education/
University of the Witwatersrand, 23-09-1998).
The idea of indigenous knowledge
Although the manifestation of what is taken to be indigenous knowledge could
presumably be traced back roughly to the origins of humankind, the idea of
indigenous knowledge is a relatively recent phenomenon. It has arguably
gained conceptual and discursive currency only during the last twenty-odd
years. Especially in recent years it has been the subject of congresses,
conferences, meetings, as well as countless papers, articles and reports. What,
then, is ‘indigenous knowledge’? What is the emphasis on indigenous
knowledge meant to achieve? 
‘Indigenous knowledge’ is generally taken to cover local, traditional,
nonwestern beliefs, practices, customs and world views, and frequently also to
refer to alternative, informal forms of knowledge. Although some writers
reject this contraposition, ‘indigenous knowledge’ is commonly contrasted,
implicitly or explicitly, with ‘knowledge from abroad’, a ‘global’,
‘cosmopolitan’, ‘western’, ‘formal’ or ‘world’ (system of) knowledge (cf
Hountondji, 1995; Cresswell, 1998; Semali and Kincheloe, eds, 1999 passim;
Odora Hoppers, 2002a; Odora Hoppers 2002 passim). Rather perplexingly,
while a lot has been said and continues to be said about the idea of indigeneity,
I have yet to come across a writer or author willing to furnish an explanation
of their understanding or concept of ‘knowledge’. Although (or because?) the
terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘epistemology/epistemological’ are used in liberal
abundance, no account is given of the actual meaning/s of the terms. Thus,
there is a general failure among theorists to appreciate and engage with the
ramifications of these concepts. Instead, ‘indigenous knowledge’ is
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unquestioningly employed as an umbrella concept to cover practices, skills,
customs, worldviews, perceptions, as well as theoretical and factual
understandings.
With regard to the second question, as to what the focus on indigenous
knowledge is hoped to achieve, there are several related ideas that appear
again and again (cf Semali and Kincheloe, 1999 passim; Odora Hoppers, 2002
passim): reclamation of cultural or traditional heritage; decolonisation of mind
and thought; recognition and acknowledgement of self-determining
development; protection against further colonisation, exploitation,
appropriation and/or commercialisation; legitimation or validation of
indigenous practices and world views; and condemnation of, or at least caution
against, the subjugation of nature and general oppressiveness of
nonindigenous rationality, science and technology.
Before I go on to critique the notion of indigenous knowledge, I want to state
that I am in principle in complete agreement with what underlies many
indigenous knowledge projects. Firstly, western knowledge, science,
technology and ‘rationality’ have led to, or have had as a significant goal, the
subjugation of nature, and so far have been devastatingly efficient. The pursuit
of nuclear energy, wholesale deforestation and destruction of flora and fauna,
factory farming of nonhuman animals for human consumption, vivisection and
genetic engineering are deplorable and – indeed – irrational. Secondly, the
inferiorisation of indigenous peoples’ practices, skills and insights has, to a
large extent, been arrogant and of similarly questionable rationality. Thirdly,
current attempts by industrial and high-tech nations to (re)colonise or
appropriate for commercial gain these practices, skills and insights are
exploitative and contemptible.
Having said this, however, I consider appeals to the concept of indigenous
knowledge, and its ‘legitimation’ or ‘validation’, as a remedy or
countermeasure to be completely misguided. Any such appeal is inadequate,
not least because of a general lack of appreciation of the semantic and logical
problems involved in employing and applying the concept of ‘knowledge’
beyond the sense of practice or skill, while still referring to the knowledge in
question as ‘indigenous’ and – as such – as ‘fundamentally different’, ‘unique’
and ‘incommensurable’ or ‘incompatible’ with ‘modern’ knowledge (Prakash,
1999, pp.160, 167, 168; Reynar, 1999, p.301, fn. 2). As I have mentioned
earlier, there is almost a complete absence of definition, even of working
definitions, of this crucial idea in the various papers that have been written and
published over the years. In what follows, I will attempt to indicate what such
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a definition might look like. This will serve not only as conceptual
clarification but also as the basis for my misgivings about indigenous
‘knowledge’.
Towards a definition of ‘knowledge’
If we consider how the terms ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’ are commonly used, we
are able to recognise and distinguish between three main kinds: knowledge-
that or factual knowledge, knowledge-how or practical knowledge and, lastly,
knowledge of persons, places, or things or knowledge by acquaintance. If
discussion of the uniqueness of indigenous people’s knowledge interprets it in
the third sense, it is fairly uncontroversial. Acquaintance with states of affairs,
geographical terrain etc. differs from individual to individual, society to
society, culture to culture – take Afghan familiarity with their own
mountainous regions, something not shared by American or Russian soldiers. 
However, in the discussion that follows, I will concentrate primarily on the
first two as the kinds of knowledge that are relevant here. It is my suspicion
that many, if not most, indigenous knowledge projects focus on the second.
The understanding of ‘indigenous knowledge’ as ‘indigenous practice, skill or
know-how’, too, is reasonably unproblematic. It makes perfect sense to say
that (different individuals in) different cultures or societies possess skills or
know-how not shared by others. Of course, there is often a close connection
between practical and factual knowledge. A traditional healer knows how to
cure people – and this implies that she presumably knows that certain roots,
berries or barks have the requisite disease-curing properties. The Inuit who
knows how to distinguish between several shades of white as well as several
different types of snow will be able to orientate himself accordingly, will know
that an animal is at a certain distance from him and that a certain stretch of
snow or ice will support his weight. The problem arises when the two kinds of
knowledge are treated as if there is no distinction between them, or at least as
if they are mutually dependent. In order to establish why this is problematic, I
need to provide a definition of factual knowledge, or knowledge-that.
Traditionally, this kind of knowledge (often also referred to as propositional
knowledge) has been argued to have three necessary and logically independent
components: belief, justification and truth. In order for a person to know
something (p), she has to believe that p, she has to be justified in believing that
p (i.e. she has to be in a position to know that p), and p has to be true. Each of
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these components has been considered essential. In isolation they do not
amount to knowledge, but in combination they are considered sufficient for
knowledge. This definition has been challenged in recent years, mainly with
regard to the sufficiency of the three conditions (Gettier, 1963). In principle I
think the objections can be met, perhaps by adding a fourth condition: a
person’s justification for believing that p must be suitably connected to the
truth of p. Now, even if these conditions are jointly sufficient for knowledge,
there remains considerable room for debate over what precisely the
justification condition involves – what degree of justification is required, what
kind of justification is appropriate etc. (Horsthemke, 2001). However, for
present purposes this (amended) definition should suffice.
I consider this conception of factual or propositional knowledge to be not only
plausible but indispensable for clearing up some of the confusions in the
debate around indigenous knowledge. In other words, the philosophical
account of the nature of knowledge may be used as a yardstick. Thus, the onus
will be on anyone who is opposed to the analysis presented here to propose not
only an alternative but a more feasible definition, one that is sufficiently
unambiguous and comprehensive to meet the challenges raised in this paper.
To assert, as I expect some theorists may do, that the philosophical definition
presented here is itself an instance of an oppressive, formal, nonindigenous
system of thought, would be to shirk the issue and to attempt to employ the
very concepts that are problematised in a tacitly self-validating manner.   
Problems: superstition, relativism, etc.
The way I see it, in cases where ‘indigenous knowledge’ is taken to refer not
to practical knowledge and skills but to knowledge-that, and where it is
contrasted with nonindigenous or cosmopolitan knowledge, problems are rife.
One needs to be clear about what the notion of indigenous knowledge implies
in such cases. Current usage by theorists generally suggests several things, all
equally problematic.
In some instances, ‘indigenous knowledge’ is taken to cover all kinds of
beliefs, with little or no reference to truth or justification. This elevates to the
status of knowledge not only mere assumption and opinion, but also
superstition, divination, soothsaying and the like (as Semali, 1999, p.98, and
Crossman and Devisch, 2002, p.117, attempt to do). In the absence of any
explicit mention of truth, then, the applicable idea would be that of
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‘indigenous beliefs’. Given the philosophical definition of knowledge, belief –
even justified belief – does not amount to knowledge.
A recent article by Philip Higgs constitutes a case in point. He argues that
“African philosophy, as a system of African knowledge(s), can provide a
useful philosophical framework for the construction of empowering
knowledge that will enable communities in South Africa to participate in their
own educational development” (Higgs, 2003, p.5). There is in Higgs an
unacknowledged quantum leap from “traditional African world-views” to
“indigenous African knowledge system” (p.11). The ‘quantum leap’ in
question concerns not only the move from (a multitude of) ‘world-views’ to a
(single) ‘knowledge system’ but that, implicit rather than explicit, from ‘belief
systems’ to ‘knowledge system’. In a related sense, a major problem concerns
what Higgs identifies as a major contribution of African philosophy, namely
the struggle of establishing an ‘African identity’ – frequently contrasted with a
‘Western Eurocentric identity’ (Higgs, 2003, pp.6, 8-11; this fallacy of
applying the collective singular is also committed in Makgoba, 1997, p.199:
“Africanisation is the process of defining or interpreting African identity and
culture”). Coupled with this idea is that of “a distinctively African epistemic
identity”, an “indigenous (African) epistemological framework”, a “unique
African order of knowledge” or “distinctively African knowledge system” that
challenges “the hegemony of Western Eurocentric forms of universal
knowledge” (Higgs, 2003, pp.5, 7, 8, 16, 17).
Just as there is no (one or single) African knowledge system, and certainly not
one that subsumes the various African world-views, the notion of a single,
homogeneous, readily identifiable ‘African identity’ (or ‘European identity’,
for that matter) is mistaken. There is a multitude of heterogeneous,
contradictory, frequently incoherent and inconsistent, and occasionally
overlapping African identities, sometimes even within one and the same
person. Failure to recognise this is not only to fly in the face of common
experience but to undermine endeavours of addressing the challenges of
multiculturalism (such as responding to diversity and differences, often
profound) in theory and practice. While there may exist “commonalities in the
African experience” (pp.13, 16), these are arguably shared by all small-scale
societies.
Finally, Higgs’s references to “a distinctively African epistemic identity”, an
“indigenous (African) epistemological framework” or a “unique African order
of knowledge” are highly problematic (cf also Moodie, 2003, p.7). Just how
‘indigenous’ or ‘African’ can an epistemological framework be? Furthermore,
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to speak of ‘the hegemony of Western Eurocentric forms of universal
knowledge’ (which may well be a contradiction in terms), coupled with the
claim that the challenge to these comes from ‘a distinctively African
knowledge system’, points to a thorough-going epistemological relativism –
with all its problems.  
To sum up, then: Higgs’s project of enlisting the help of “African philosophy 
. . . (to) provide a useful. . . framework for the construction of empowering
knowledge that will enable communities in South Africa to participate in their
own educational development” (Higgs, 2003, p.5) is doomed to failure. Ben
Parker has commented that Higgs’s “failures are useful insofar as they raise
interesting questions about philosophical and educational discourses and the
ways they are embedded in communities” Parker, 2003, p.23). Briefly,
Parker’s problems with Higgs stem from the consideration that the pedagogies
and values enumerated by the latter are ‘distinctively’ or ‘particularly
African’. Parker also doubts that these stem from a “deep socioethical sense of
cultural unity” among Africans (Parker, 2003, p.29). It follows, he says, that
without “a clear understanding of what makes values into African values, we
cannot give a clear meaning to an ‘activist African philosophy of education’”
(Parker, 2003, p.30). 
Parker is somewhat uncritical vis-à-vis Higgs’s identification of ‘traditional
African world-views’ as ‘philosophy’, and their purported challenge to “the
hegemony of Western forms of universal knowledge” (Higgs, 2003, pp.5, 17;
Parker, 2003, pp.26, 27), as well as in his implicit acceptance (with Makgoba
and Higgs) of, and lip service to, “an African culture and identity” (Parker,
2003, p.31). Yet, he rightly cautions against the negation of universalism
within (some) African philosophy: “There is a danger that this form of
‘Africanism’ becomes isolationist and exclusionary of the non-African”. He
asks, tellingly, “If one rejects all Eurocentric values, does one also reject
human rights?” (Parker, 2003, p.32) The problem, I submit, resides with the
basic irrationality that underlies the sort of name-calling Parker seems to be
referring to here. The idea of human rights, whatever its origin, cannot by
definition be anything but a universal value. (This consideration will prove to
be significant later in this paper.) Similarly, there is an important sense in
which knowledge – in order to be knowledge in the factual or propositional
sense – is necessarily universal. 
Writers often also refer to the (need for) ‘validation’ or ‘legitimation’ of
indigenous knowledge, or to ‘warranted’ and ‘valid’ knowledge (cf Semali and
Kincheloe, 1999, p.35; Rains, 1999, p.328; Odora Hoppers, 2002a, p.7; Odora
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Hoppers, 2002c, pp.7, 12; Fatnowna and Pickett, 2002a, p.75; Moodie, 2003,
p.8). All these references are tautologies. Considering the centrality of
justification, knowledge is necessarily valid, legitimate, warranted. There
simply could be no other knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is invalid,
illegitimate or unwarranted. It would not be knowledge then. This is not to
deny that knowledge can be and often is subjugated. A pertinent consideration
here would concern the impact of the first significant astronomical discoveries
on a flat-earth, geocentric worldview, or of the theory of evolution on an
orthodox, deity-fearing mindset, and the subsequent suppression of these
views. But here the emphasis has changed, subtly, to incorporate truth. (It
should be noted that reference to ‘true knowledge’, too, involves a tautology.) 
In other instances, reference to truth is explicit, the underlying assumption
being that there are multitudinous truths, that with a multiplicity of indigenous
cultures and subcultures there exists a multiplicity of truths, none of which are
superior to any other (cf Semali and Kincheloe, 1999, pp.27, 28; Abdullah and
Stringer, 1999, p.153; Odora Hoppers, 2002c, p.14; Fatnowna and Pickett,
2002b, p.214). This kind of view leads directly to epistemological relativism
and to relativism about truth, with all their attendant difficulties. Why is
relativism problematic? Briefly, to be a relativist about knowledge is to
maintain that there is no objective knowledge of reality (or better: of realities)
independently of knowers from relevant social groups. The difficulty for
relativists is to avoid the inconsistent claim that the relativistic thesis is itself
an item of objective knowledge. To be a relativist about truth is to maintain
that there is no universal truth, that there is only a multitude of truths. The
difficulty for relativists is to avoid the inconsistent claim that the relativistic
thesis is itself universally (transculturally) true. 
As a pertinent case, in the latter regard, I want to cite Elza Venter who states
that the “creation of a non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa presents
a challenge to everybody in the country” (Venter, 1997, p.57). Educators not
only “need to learn to accommodate different value systems and to place them
within a framework of common human values” but “as significant change
agents in a diverse society. . .  should (also) be educated to accept that there is
no absolute, universally uncontested truth” (Venter, 1997, p.57). This is a
point Venter makes repeatedly: “There is no absolute truth endorsed by every
scientist and educational practitioner through all time” (Venter, 1997, p.59)
and, “People need to accept that there is no one unique truth which is fixed
and found, but rather a diversity of valid, and even conflicting, versions of a
world in the making” (Venter, 1997, p.62). Throughout, Venter seems to be
unaware of the inconsistency of advancing these statements as truths. Apart
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from endorsing a problematic relativism about truth, her lip service to value
pluralism frequently assumes the shape of cultural or moral relativism. Given
a pluralism of value systems, and the purported absence of a vantage point
from which truths (scientific or normative) could be established, her rejection
of former South African philosophies of education, Christian National
Education and fundamental pedagogics, is similarly inconsistent. In South
Africa, Venter claims, there “should not only be an emphasis on similarities
within differences, but also on the differences per se, to get the whole picture”
(Venter, 1997, pp.61-62). Again, this presupposes the possibility of a vantage
point from which one can get and evaluate ‘the whole picture’ – which her
own position does not appear to yield.
A related and similarly problematic view implicitly concerns the idea of
certainty and, therefore, the justification condition in the definition of
knowledge given above. It is a view that has been gaining currency since the
introduction of the new education system in South Africa. Unlike the old
approach that regarded knowledge as fixed, outcomes-based education or OBE
– we are told – regards knowledge as uncertain and changing. (For a similar
view, see Crossman and Devisch, 2002, p.110.) The obvious difficulty is, of
course, to avoid advancing the proposal that ‘knowledge is uncertain and
changing’ as a knowledge claim, since this would lead to paradox. If this is
knowledge, then it is itself subject to uncertainty and change – which
contradicts the initial statement. It may at some point turn out to be no longer
true (meaning that knowledge may at some point turn out to be certain and
unchanging). If, on the other hand, this piece of knowledge is itself certain and
not subject to change, then there is some knowledge that is not uncertain and
changing – which, again, contradicts the statement.
The implications should be obvious now. If something is referred to as
‘indigenous knowledge’ in the sense of factual or propositional knowledge, it
must meet the requisite criteria: belief, justification and truth. If it does, it is on
a par with nonindigenous knowledge in a particular area or field. Thus, the
sangoma’s (traditional healer’s) knowledge would be on a par with that of a
general medical practitioner, like the knowledge of a naturopath or
homoeopath. The insights into climate change, animal behaviour and plant life
cycles of a Bushman or South American Indian would be on a par with those
of western biologists or climatologists. In fact, both could arguably learn from
each other. It is important to bear in mind that there is no question here of
different truths (different beliefs perhaps, different methods of justification
almost certainly), no question of (radically) different knowledges. Truth and
reality are essentially not in the eye of the beholder.
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What Tony Moodie, in a recent paper, describes as “alternative ways of
knowing” and considers to characterise a “participatory epistemology”
(Moodie, 2003, pp.7, 20), encompasses intuition or intuitive modes of
consciousness, “matters of ‘spirit’” (Moodie, 203, p.19). Leaning as it does
heavily on trends emanating from Romanticism, Moodie’s argument is in
essence a somewhat uncritical tribute to ‘non-western intellectual traditions’, a
eulogy of the uncorrupted ‘natural condition’ of the ‘noble savage’. The latter
idea is implicit, of course – given that it is hardly ‘politically correct’. Yet, the
modern heirs of this conception of human beings are inter alia Afrocentrism
and the African Renaissance. On the other hand, Moodie’s idea of a
‘participatory epistemology’ is very useful and can conceivably be pursued
and applied without embracing relativism or a questionable romanticisation of
the indigene.
Attempts to establish common ground: 
Cosmic Africa and Where The Green Ants Dream
In what follows, I wish to review two filmic suggestions – one explicit, the
other less overt – for resolving the apparent conflicts regarding culture and
cognition with which my paper is concerned. The film Cosmic Africa, by
South African brothers Craig and Damon Foster, documents the journey of
South African astrophysicist Thebe Medupe, who has just completed his
doctorate. His mission is stated at the very beginning of the film: “I need to
discover whether my science has a place in Africa, and whether Africa has a
place in my science.” His journey leads him to the Ju’hoansi in Namibia, the
Dogon in Mali and to what is conceivably the site of the first observatory in
Egypt.
During his visit to Namibia, Medupe learns not only of Ju’hoansi reliance on
the stars as to when to plant and to harvest but many of the stories connected
to the sun, moon and stars: “Where I see two giant stars, they (the Ju’hoansi
and their shaman Kxao Tami) see two sons, lions, eland horns and giant
furnaces.” His visit to the Ju’hoansi coincides with a total solar eclipse. He
worries about whether he should tell the people about what is going to happen
but decides not to: they would want to know how he knows. Instead, he sets
up his equipment. When the eclipse happens, people talk about the return of
winter and blame the intruder and his equipment: “The telescope is eating up
the sun.” After the eclipse and subsequent reconciliation, Medupe says, “For
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the first time I see how the stars affect the way people live. My science and my
Africa are beginning to come together.” 
This impression is deepened with the visit to the Dogon, whose knowledge of
the stars is legendary. Their daily and seasonal activities, routines and customs
are guided, for example, by the appearance of what we call Venus, the
Pleaides etc. One of the elders, spiritual leader Annaye Doumbo, claims, “In
our Dogon way, the man who makes technology is the sorcerer of the sun”.
Given the harsh conditions under which they live, to the Dogon knowing the
stars can mean the difference between life and death. Does the elder know that
human beings have walked on the moon? “There is no gate to the moon”, is
the reply, “It is not possible for anyone to go there, unless they are the little
brother of God.” 
The last leg of Medupe’s journey is what is presented as the origin of
astronomy, Egypt. (There is no mention of the innovations and discoveries of
the Maya and Aztecs.) In the southern Egyptian desert, near the border of
Sudan, he discovers what is conceivably the first observatory, countless stones
emanating from a centre, in order to trace the rising and setting of the sun
during the year: “The origin of astronomy, its measuring and predicting, is in
Africa. . . Stones took the place that my computer takes now.”
It is unfortunate that, throughout the film, Medupe and the Foster brothers
never explore any of the tensions between traditional, indigenous and
scientific world views. They seem satisfied with just noting the different
perceptions and appear to assume that there is no problem of reconciliation of
myth or legend with scientific fact. At the end of the film, Medupe states that
he has come “full circle”, that his journey has served to (re)unite “his science”
and “his Africa”, without so much as an attempt to account for the
contradictions he has encountered between spirituality and astronomy.
In contrast to this kind of bald assertion, German film maker Werner Herzog’s
film Wo die grünen Ameisen träumen offers a tacit suggestion how apparent
cultural, cognitive and epistemological impasses might be resolved. A huge
international mining corporation wants to do some excavations and subsequent
land development, mining in a particular region in rural Australia. The region
targeted turns out to include a sacred site for indigenous Australians. Wanting
to keep everything legitimate and above board, the company offers the
Aboriginal people generous recompensation. The latter, through their
spokespersons, refuse to accept the offer. When asked for the reason for their
refusal – after all, the sum offered is perceived to be able to make a major
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difference with regard to the general upliftment of the community – the
company representatives are offered a simple but cryptic answer: “Because the
green ants are dreaming, and their dreams may not be disturbed.” Irritated by
this apparent stubbornness and irrationality, the corporation transfers a certain
sum to a bank account opened especially for Aboriginal purposes and sends in
bulldozers, trucks, tractors and the like. On their arrival in the region,
company workers find Aboriginal people blocking the way, seated in silent
protest, refusing to allow any of the vehicles through. 
This scenario appears to offer a classic example of the kind of impasse
mentioned above: western technology, science and development projects
versus indigenous knowledge and spirituality, with neither side being able or
perhaps even wanting to comprehend the other’s rationale. Yet, examined
carefully, the Aboriginal response may also be taken to allude to ecological
disaster. While its spiritual element may be inaccessible to western developers,
the warning concerning devastation of the environment certainly is not. Thus,
over and above the blatant immorality of the disregard for indigenous cultural
and spiritual heritage, there are cogent objective reasons for resolving this
impasse one way rather than another. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the emphasis of indigenous
knowledge is held to be significant with regard to antiracism, antisexism, and
postcolonialism, in general, and in terms of the ‘African Renaissance’ (Odora
Hoppers, 2000; Ntuli, 2002), in particular. If I am correct in having diagnosed
‘indigenous knowledge’ as involving at best an incomplete, partial or, at
worst, a questionable understanding or conception of knowledge, the questions
that remain to be answered are: What is an appropriate tool in terms of anti-
discrimination and anti-repression? Is the study of indigenous knowledge
irrelevant in terms of education and educational curricula in South Africa?
Educational and ethical consequences
Recognition, protection against exploitation, appropriation, counteracting
wholesale subjugation of everything that is deemed subjugatable is best
achieved not on the basis of appeals to the validity of ‘indigenous knowledge’
and ‘indigenous knowledge systems’, but by locating the pleas for recognition
etc. in a rights-based framework. The latter has potential for the necessary
educational, ethical and political clout to effect lasting changes. Insofar as
human rights are anchored in as well as responsive to human agency, rights
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are essential for the protection of human differences. In essence, taking rights
seriously implies taking individual, social and cultural identity seriously. 
What are the implications for education? Which aspects of so-called
‘indigenous’, ‘local’, ‘alternative’, ‘informal’ and – in our case – African
traditional knowledge should be taught or included in the curriculum? Which
should be left out? On what grounds? The question as to what should be left
out is fairly easily answered. Not included in the curriculum, i.e. not under the
guise of ‘knowledge’, should be mere beliefs or opinions unanchored by
reason/s, bald assertions, superstitions, prejudice, bias – in fact anything that
involves myth, fabrication and constitutes an infringement on the rights of
learners. However, it may be pedagogically and epistemically useful to teach
these qua beliefs, opinions, assertions, superstitions, prejudice and bias.
The question as to which aspects of, say, African traditional knowledge should
be included probably requires a more comprehensive response than I am able
to provide here. Briefly, skills and practical knowledge are worthy of
inclusion, as are traditional music, art, dance, and folklore (qua folklore).
Moreover, it follows from the account provided above that anything that meets
the essential requirements for knowledge-that could in principle be included,
traditional African knowledge of agriculture and environment, insights into
conflict-resolution and the like. Naturally, the context and environment of
learners should be taken into account here. That is to say, learners should be
taught only what is appropriate to their age or, more correctly, to their
cognitive and affective capabilities. Similarly, they should be taught primarily
what is relevant or what is likely to be relevant to their lives.
A sangoma’s insight that one should only use a limited amount of bark from a
given tree, or that one should harvest no more than one-tenth of a given
natural resource (i.e. harvest a plant only if it is one of ten such plants growing
in the vicinity), constitutes an insight that may not be shared by many, but it
has universal value and application. There is a staggering amount of common
ground between cultures, not only in terms of factual knowledge but also in
terms of values. A rapprochement between so-called ‘indigenous’ and
‘nonindigenous’ insights is not only possible but desirable – on educational,
ethical, as well as political grounds.
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